Abstract: Many countries have passed regulations to encourage renewable electricity (RES-E) generation in the last two decades. The two most popular policy types are feed-in tariffs (FIT) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS). A few econometric studies have assessed the effectiveness of these policies, but most do not account for policy design features and market characteristics that influence policy strength.
Introduction
Many national, regional, and local governments have passed regulations to encourage renewable electricity (RES-E) generation in the last two decades. Renewable electricity generation sources include biomass, geothermal energy, hydroelectric power, wave power, tidal power, solar photovoltaic, solar thermal and wind power. Motivations for regulatory support of RES-E generation include rising concerns over climate change and pollution, national security concerns associated with fossil fuel availability, and a desire to increase the competitiveness of new energy sources in markets traditionally dominated by fossil fuels.
Varieties of renewable energy policy design
RES-E policies can be characterized along two regulatory dimensions. First, policies differ in their approach with regard to the "Prices vs. Quantities" divide coined by Weitzman (1974) . Second, there is variation when it comes to the regulatory focus between the support of investment and the support of generation (Haas et al. 2004 , Haas et al. 2008 , Menanteau et al. 2003 . Policies are categorized along these dimensions in Table 1 . Haas et al. (2008) .
Two of the most popular policy types for encouraging RES-E generation in the developed world are quotas (also known as renewable portfolio standards) and feed-in tariffs. The quota is a form of command-and-control quantity regulation that requires utilities to generate a certain portion of their electricity from renewable sources. It tends to promote the lowest-cost RES-E technologies, as utilities can typically choose from a variety of technologies to meet their quota requirement. In contrast, the FIT is a form of price regulation that increases the payment received by RES-E producers for each kilowatt-hour generated. It provides a technology-specific subsidy to improve the competitiveness of RES-E generation relative to conventional generation. The effect is often to equalize attractiveness among energy technologies with different production costs. Despite these differences in design, FIT and quota policies are related in that (1) they are intended to promote RES-E generation beyond what would have occurred otherwise and (2) the costs of doing so are typically born by the end user.
The feed-in-tariff (FIT) is the most popular RES-E support scheme in European countries. However, there is considerable variety in the design of individual FIT policies (Couture and Gagnon 2010) . This implies that each FIT is unique in structure and, as this paper will show, in the incentive it provides.
FIT policies may differ in one or more of the following characteristics:
• Fixed-price vs. premium tariff: A FIT may be structured as either a fixed-price tariff, which guarantees that electricity generators can sell their electricity to the grid at a set price, or a premium tariff, which adds a bonus to the wholesale market price received by generators. In the EU, Denmark and Cyprus are the only countries that have implemented a premium tariff. All other countries with a FIT employ the fixed-price design.
• Cost allocation: Under a FIT, the generator signs a contract that entitles it to feed electricity into the grid prior to any other conventional source. The difference between the tariff and the actual market price is in most countries re-distributed among end-users or paid from state budgets. To avoid overburdening end-users, Spain and six other countries cap the total tariff value available each year.
• Contract duration: The duration over which the FIT is paid to the generator varies considerably between countries. There is often a tradeoff between duration and magnitude. For example, the Netherlands provide a relatively high tariff for a contract duration of 10 years only, while Luxembourg provides a lower tariff for 20 years.
• Applicable energy technologies: FIT policies in most countries support all renewable electricity technologies with the exception of large-scale hydroelectric power. However, some countries restrict FIT applicability to specific technologies. For example, France supports wind power, biomass, and solar PV only, whereas Italy focuses entirely on solar PV.
• Tariff amount: The tariff received by generators may differ in size between countries and energy technologies. The following factors may influence the size of the tariff received by a given RES-E installation:
o Generation Cost: Tariff size strongly depends on the cost of electricity generation of the RES-E technology to which it applies. For example, cost-intensive solar PV may receive up to ten times the support of onshore wind, as wind is already costcompetitive with conventional capacity in many regions. Policymakers generally attempt to balance the differences in costs between technologies in order to provide similar expected returns on investment regardless of the technology-specific cost. Therefore, the FIT is sometimes called a cost-neutral policy tool. However, differences in cost estimates and political preference for certain national "champion" technologies result in differing returns provided by individual FIT policies.
o Location: Tariffs are sometimes designed to affect RES-E technologies differently depending on their location. The placement of an installation (e.g. roof-top panels vs. field-panels for solar PV; onshore vs. offshore for wind; etc.) is often considered, as is the geographical location (e.g. urban vs. rural, region of the country, etc.).
o System size: In most cases, FIT policies guarantee a higher tariff to small-scale RES-E installations than to large-scale systems. Caps on FIT support for solar PV systems have in many cases limited their development to small-scale projects, mainly those built on private households.
o Receiving party: Most FIT policies provide larger incentives for private investors than for large-scale industrial investors. The rationale behind this approach is to increase private household energy autonomy. For example, some cities have established local solar potential trading schemes. Citizens can supply their rooftop potential if they are unable to meet the high upfront costs of PV installations, while investors supply the solar PV technology. The FIT is then shared between both trading partners.
o Purpose of host building: Solar panels may receive differing tariff amounts depending on the primary use of the building on which they are installed. For example, panels placed on carports often receive higher tariffs than those in installations designed solely for electricity generation. This approach is designed to encourage upgrades to existing buildings instead of the construction of new ones.
• Digression rate: Many FIT policies have a built-in digression rate, a mechanism for reducing the tariff value of contracts that are signed further in the future after policy enactment. The goal is to slowly adjust the incentive provided by the FIT, both to adapt to and incentivize cost reductions in RES-E generation over time.
Several other types of RES-E policies have emerged in the EU in the last two decades as well. Six countries have introduced tradable green certificate systems. Seven countries have introduced tax incentive or investment grants. Four have implemented a tendering system, a type of quantity regulation. Denmark and Italy also augment their RES-E policies with a net-metering policy. In the U.S., quantity regulation in the form of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) has emerged as the dominant policy tool at the state level, with 29 states and the District of Colombia implementing an RPS by 2011 (DSIRE 2011; Palmer et al. 2011) . Worldwide, more than 80 countries employ policies to promote RES-E (REN21 2010).
The question of RES-E development and FIT effectiveness in Europe
Between 1990 and 2011, 23 EU member countries implemented a feed-in tariff to support solar PV or onshore wind development. Table 2 displays the years of enactment for major RES-E policy types in Europe. Policy enactment is skewed over time: some countries such as Germany and Italy adopted RES-E policies very early, but most have done so within the last decade. 6  SE  FI  NL  PL  SK  CY  MT   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 Each row represents a policy type. Italics designate premium FIT policies. (1) Fixed or premium FIT for onshore wind, (2) fixed or premium FIT for solar PV, (3) first cap introduced, (4) quota scheme, (5) tendering scheme, (6) tax incentive/ investment grant. Source: Res-legal (2011), Ragwitz et al. (2011), and REN21 (2010) .
During this same time period, RES-E generation capacity in EU 27 countries has developed rapidly and unevenly. Figure 1 displays trends in cumulative non-hydro RES-E generation capacity in EU countries. Figure 2 focuses on Germany, Spain, and Italy, as their installed RES-E capacity is much larger than the rest of the sample. Figures 3 and 4 display solar PV capacity specifically and Figures 5 and 6 display onshore wind capacity. Previous studies have examined these dividing paths using an array of macroeconomic, ecological and socio-economic factors. A few quantitative studies have assessed the effectiveness of RES-E policies, but this is an area of surprisingly sparse research.
Research question and contribution
In light of the differences in RES-E development and FIT enactment between countries and over time, a key question for policymakers is whether FIT policies have actually increased RES-E generation capacity beyond what would have occurred in their absence. In this paper, we develop the first rigorous econometric analysis of FIT effectiveness in Europe to date. The primary contribution of our paper is to develop an indicator for the strength of FIT policies that takes into account differences in policy design. Specifically, we capture heterogeneity in tariff size, contract duration, digression rate, electricity wholesale price, and electricity generation cost to construct a measure of the return-on-investment (ROI) provided by each policy. We develop a technologyspecific fixed-effects regression model to test the significance of this indicator using historical data on solar PV and onshore wind power in the EU. The model controls for fixed country-level characteristics that may be correlated with both policy implementation and RES-E development. This paper improves and expands on the existing literature in three key ways. First, it focuses on a policy type and a region that have been largely ignored in previous studies. Second, it accounts for unique policy design features that have been largely ignored in econometric analyses of RES-E policies in general. Third, it provides a detailed literature review and summary of trends in econometric RES-E policy analysis, with a focus on methodology.
We find that FIT policies are a major driver of solar PV and onshore wind capacity development. However, this effect is overstated without controlling for country characteristics and may not be observed at all without accounting for the unique design of each policy.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section two provides a literature review on econometric RES-E policy assessments with a specific focus on the models used. Section three presents our empirical framework, including our new indicator that quantifies ROI for FIT policies, regression specification, selection of controls, and data. Section four provides regression results that we discuss in section five. This last section also goes beyond the empirical assessment and discusses different types of uncertainty that have a theoretical impact on capacity development but are difficult to quantify.
Literature Review
Literature on the role of policy in the development of renewable energy sources (RES) is vast. However, the majority of research takes a normative or descriptive approach to outlining the factors that influence RES development. Relying on case studies (del Río González and Gual 2007 , del Río González 2008 , Lesser and Su 2008 , Lipp 2007 , and other qualitative evaluation techniques, it has been suggested that FIT policies are an important element in explaining the success of RES development in Europe.
Rigorous empirical studies of renewable energy policy effectiveness are less common. Studies with methods or results relevant to our analysis are summarized in Table 3 . However, to our knowledge, the present paper is the first study to apply econometric methods to the problem of FIT effectiveness is Europe. Most econometric studies assessing the effectiveness of renewable energy policies to date have focused on state-level policies in the United States, particularly RPS schemes. However, several lessons can be learned from recent developments in the study of RPS policies and applied to an analysis of FIT policies in Europe. These studies can be divided into three groups: (1) those that employ cross-sectional specifications, (2) those that use panel data to control for state-level characteristics, and (3) more nuanced analyses that use more complex dependent and/or independent variables to articulate differences in policy design or policy responsiveness.
The first group (Menz and Vachon 2006, Adelaja and Hailu 2008) employs pooled cross-section regressions to look at the impact of policy variables (usually a binary variable or simple numeric indicator such as the dollar value of a tax credit) on RES-E capacity development. Alegappan et al.
(2011) rely on descriptive statistics only. These studies find a strong positive correlation between RPS (and some other policies) and renewable energy development. However, their specifications do not control for state-level characteristics or time trends that may be correlated with both policy implementation and RES-E development, so this relationship cannot be interpreted as causal.
The second group (Carley 2009 , Delmas 2011 , Marques et al. 2010 , Shrimali and Kniefel 2011 provides empirical evidence to support this concern. These studies use fixed-effects regression models or other strategies to reduce omitted variables bias from state characteristics that are correlated with both policy implementation and renewable energy deployment. They suggest a less certain relationship between RPS policies and deployment. For example, Carley (2009) finds that RPS implementation does not predict the percentage of energy generation from renewable sources, though the number of years a state maintains an RPS is a significant determinant of total renewable energy capacity development. Shrimali and Kniefel (2011) find that RPS policies actually appear to reduce the penetration of some RES-E technologies and overall RES-E capacity, while they increase the penetration of others. These results call into question the effectiveness of RPS policies once non-policy state characteristics have been controlled for.
The third group (Marques et al. 2011, Yin and Powers 2009) Applying this new measure within a fixed-effects specification, they find that RPS policies have had a significant and positive effect on renewable energy deployment. Most importantly, they verify that this effect would not be observed if differences in policy design are ignored, as done in studies that use binary policy variables only.
The two primary analyses of RES-E development drivers in Europe are provided by Marques et al. (2010; . In the first paper, they use a panel FEVD model on a sample of 24 European countries from 1990 to 2006 to estimate the effect of general political and socioeconomic factors on the renewable energy percentage of total electricity generation. The empirical approach of the second paper was discussed above. These papers find that the fossil fuel industry lobby is a negative driver of development, while energy dependency, energy consumption, and the European Union Directive 2001/77/EC-which created mandatory RES-E targets for EU member countries-are positive drivers. However, neither of these studies specifically assesses the impact of individual policy types.
Empirical Framework and Data
The primary objective of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of FIT policies in promoting renewable electricity capacity development.
Leveraging lessons learned from the above studies, we make three key contributions. First, we apply a rigorous econometric framework to the problem of FIT effectiveness in Europe. We assemble country-specific data at a technology-specific level for solar PV and onshore wind capacity for the period from 1998 to 2008 in 24 European Union countries. 1 Thus, we can not only test for the impact of political and socioeconomic variables on RES-E development as done by Marques et al. (2010; , but we can also assess the effectiveness of FIT policies specifically. Second, we use a fixed-effects panel data approach to control for unobserved state-level characteristics that may influence both policy implementation and renewable energy development. Third, we develop a new statistical indicator for feed-in tariffs-similar to that developed by Yin and Powers (2009) for RPS-that accounts for policy design elements that may influence policy strength.
Dependent variable selection
A review of the literature reveals several possible dependent variables to represent RES-E development. The options differ along two dimensions: (1) whether development includes nameplate capacity, actual generation, or total energy supply and (2) whether development is represented as a cumulative total, yearly change, or a ratio of renewable to conventional energy.
In this paper, we use capacity instead of generation to reflect the investment decision as purely as possible. Capacity mirrors the investor's decision without being biased by forces the investor cannot foresee or control. While RES-E generation is largely determined by installed capacity, it is also affected by weather, equipment performance, technical problems, and other factors. In other words, generation determines the actual return on investment while capacity reflects the expected return on investment. Since our goal is to examine links between FIT policies and the decision to invest in solar PV or wind installations (rather than the actual value derived from those installations), capacity is the most relevant metric. We also use added renewable capacity instead of the ratio of renewable electricity to total electricity capacity for two reasons. First, while feedin tariffs are designed to increase RES-E capacity, they are not explicitly designed to increase the share of RES-E relative to other electricity sources (unlike RPS policies, for example). In other words, RES-E ratio is not technically a good metric for the "effectiveness" of a feed-in tariff. Second, using a ratio introduces additional statistical variability that is not relevant to our analysis. Other types of generation capacity may be added or lost due to forces unrelated to RES-E development.
We use added capacity as an alternative to total capacity because we want the effect of a policy to be isolated from cumulative development of capacity before an investment is made. A FIT contributes to the return on investment associated with an RES-E system installed in a given year. The value added by the FIT is set for that year through the duration of the contract. Therefore, the investor makes his or her decision on the basis of this year's FIT and this year's cost, as well as anticipated future costs. FIT levels and capacity development in previous years are unlikely to affect the individual investor's decision. In order to measure the marginal effect of a FIT policy in a given year, the effect must be isolated from past trends. The use of added capacity as the dependent variable fulfills this requirement. This has the effect of controlling for trends in total capacity over time. Consequently, we do not employ year fixed effects as a control. Doing so would drastically alter the interpretation of coefficients by calculating the "change of a change" in the dependent variable.
Finally, we use technology-specific capacity data because FIT policies tend to be structured differently depending on the energy technology to which they apply. We conduct separate regressions for solar PV and onshore wind, allowing us to estimate the effect of technologyspecific FIT policies on technology-specific capacity development. With the exception of Menz and Vachon (2006) and Shrimali and Kniefel (2011) , previous studies have used total RES-E data or the RE share of total energy supply and therefore do not distinguish between the relative contribution of different energy technologies. We obtained capacity data from Eurostat (2011) and the UN Energy Statistics Database (2011).
Assessing the strength of feed-in tariffs
Behavioral research sheds some light on the link between FIT policies and RES-E development. Burer and Wustenhagen (2009) surveyed European and North American venture capital investors to determine their preferred policy environment for investing. The authors found that investors prefer feed-in tariffs above other policy types, largely because they reduce investment risk more than other policies. Building on Held (2009), Masini and Menichetti (2010) also employ a survey to examine behavioral factors that influence investments in energy systems. Their study demonstrates the key importance of clear policy signals in driving investment and finds that investors strongly favor feed-in tariffs over any other RES-E policy. In addition, investors consider tariff size and contract duration of feed-in-tariffs almost equally important. While these authors take a qualitative ex-ante approach, we complement and verify their work with a quantitative expost approach. They ask investors to what extent the political and market environment shapes investment decisions; we rigorously quantify and test the significance of those drivers in actual RES-E deployment.
The investment incentive provided by feed-in tariffs varies significantly depending on how each policy is designed and the market in which it operates. Key factors are the size of the tariff paid to the electricity producer, wholesale electricity price, the length of a contract agreement under a tariff, and the cost of RES-E electricity production. In order to take these factors into account, we developed a new indicator for feed-in tariff strength (SFIT). For energy technology i, in country s, in year t, SFIT is defined as
where FIT ist is the price received by a producer for electricity sold to the grid under a FIT contract (in Eurocents/kWh). For fixed-price tariffs, this is the amount of the tariff. For premium tariffs, this is the market price of electricity plus the bonus. This value also takes into account digression rates where applicable-i.e. FIT ist is reduced depending on the number of years after policy enactment t occurs. CT ist is the duration of a FIT contract (in years) established in year t. P st is the wholesale electricity price (in Eurocents/kWh) in year t. While the tariff size is fixed for the duration of the contract, the wholesale electricity price is subject to fluctuation. Therefore, investors in RES-E capacity must deal with uncertainty in estimating future revenues. We assume that the investor will expect the wholesale electricity price to remain stable at P st over the lifetime of capacity installed in year t. LT it is the expected lifetime (in years) of a solar panel or wind turbine constructed in year t. ACOE ist is the average cost of electricity production for capacity built in year t (in Eurocents/kWh).
Intuitively, SFIT represents the return on investment (ROI) associated with RES-E capacity installed in year t. The numerator represents total profit (revenue minus cost) received by a RES-E producer for generating one kWh per year over the lifetime of a panel or turbine installed under a FIT contract in year t. During the FIT contract, the producer receives revenue of FIT ist . After the contract has expired, revenue drops to the wholesale market price until the end of the capacity's lifetime. The denominator represents the total lifetime cost of producing one kWh annually. Therefore, SFIT is the ratio of profit to cost per kWh over the lifetime of capacity installed in year t-i.e. the return on investment (ROI) associated with the capacity. We assume constant capacity utilization across the entire panel. For years in which no FIT policy has been enacted, CT = 0 and SFIT represents the ROI received by RES-E producers in the absence of a FIT. Overall, SFIT is a more nuanced indicator of the true installation incentive provided by a FIT, as compared to traditional binary policy variables that are simply "on" if a policy is in place and "off" if it is not. 
Policy data
In the majority of cases, FIT policies pay different tariffs to different technologies. While other studies have neglected this heterogeneity, this study accounts for the different levels of tariffs by focusing on two technologies separately. Still, the model cannot cover the complete continuum of heterogeneity in FIT policies. The majority of countries pay a fixed tariff per kWh to the producer of electricity from wind onshore systems. Solar PV FIT schemes are more diverse, as tariff size varies with the size of the installation and its ownership. We follow GreenX by relying on the mean value of the PV tariff across all size, location and ownership categories, recognizing that some information is lost in order to gain feasibility. 
Cost data
To complete RES-E cost data for the full time series, a linear function was fitted to the 2006-2020 data for each country and data for 1998-2005 were backcasted based on this function. Thus, the full model is based on 103 backcasted data points and 75 GreenX (EEG 2009a) data points. As a robustness check, we replaced the linear function with other functions such as logistic and cubic polynomial curves. Results did not vary significantly and R-squared remained consistently above 94%. To further scrutinize the back cast, country-specific annual cost reduction learning curves were compared to cross-country costs estimated by Schilling and Esmundo (2009) . Nemet (2007) collected data from 156 learning curve studies and found a similar linear fit for PV cost deduction, starting in the late 1980's. The country-specific annual learning effects of photovoltaic and onshore wind technology used in this study range from 2% to 12% and 0% to 4% respectively.
Over the 1998-2008 time series, there was a slight increase in the EU average cost of electricity production from wind power. This increase was mostly driven by Eastern European countries. The effect may have been due to increases in operation, maintenance and labor cost in Eastern European countries, while upfront and capital costs remained constant or declined slightly. The intensification of trade with Western EU countries and the adoption of European labor standards may explain why wind production became more expensive in these new EU member countries over the years.
Endogeneity
As Nemet (2007) points out for solar PV, technological learning is partly driven by the amount of capacity installed. This raises the question of whether the RES-E production included in SFIT is already affected by capacity development. This would cause an endogeneity problem, as our model would attempt to explain capacity development using the SFIT indicator which relies on cost data that is partially determined by capacity. In the words of the GreenX final report (2009b), "For most [except wave power] technologies the future investment costs are based on endogenous technological learning. Learning rates are assumed at least for each decade separately referring to the global development of the considered technology." Since learning effects are calculated on a global level, and standard economics assumes this will not to be affected by the development of capacity at the country level in the short term, we do not expect the endogeneity issue to generate significant bias. 
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Additional explanatory variables for RES-E development
We include the "incremental percentage requirement" variable (INCRQMTSHARE st ) developed by Yin and Powers to represent RPS or quota strength. This indicator represents "the mandated increase in renewable generation in terms of the percentage of all generation" (Yin and Powers 2009: 1142) . The indicator calculates the difference between the policy-determined nominal share of RES-E required and the existing RES-E sales that are already eligible to meet the quota, while also taking into account the portion of capacity over which the RPS has jurisdiction. The ratio of the required/existing gap to the total annual electricity sales covered by the quota yields the incremental percentage requirement. We calculated this indicator for the EU countries that employ a quota system. In 2009, Sweden had the strongest quota policy with an ICRQMTSHARE of 14.6%. Other countries, such as Poland and Belgium, have indicators close to zero, implying that that their quotas are close to being attained and are unlikely to provide much incentive for additional RES-E generation capacity.
As has been outlined above, tax credits and investment loans are price-driven policies to promote investment in RES-E. Tendering schemes are quantity regulations also supporting RES-E. We control for these policies by incorporating binary codes that equal 1 if a policy is in place and 0 if it is not. An alternative would be to include nominal variables to represent these policies, but there are three arguments for including binary controls only. First, reliable data for cross-country analysis of these variables is not readily available. Second, these policies are not the dominant tools in Europe and are often seen as supplementary to FIT policies and quotas. Third, the model already embraces a high degree of variance caused by using the SFIT and the INCRQMTSHARE. Additional variability makes interpretation less accurate and more complex. Data on these binary policy variables were collected from RES-Legal (2011), REN21 (2010), EEG (2009a), the IEA Policies and Measures Database (IEA 2011a) and Ragwitz et al. (2010; .
The remaining control variables are taken from the literature and are outlined in Table 4 . Marques et al. (2011) provide the most sophisticated analysis of socioeconomic variables driving RES-E development in Europe to date. Unlike many previous studies, they include controls for GDP and the relative contribution of conventional energy sources to the overall fuel mix. In order to produce comparable results, we apply the controls used by Marques et al. (2011) . As will be a topic in the discussion section, Marques et al. find negative coefficients when regressing the share of electricity from oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy on RES-E development. This is surprising, since these sources are associated with very different national attributes and we would therefore expect them to have different impacts on the dependent variable. Specifically, one might assume that if electricity from coal-fired and nuclear plants is among the most affordable, then a high share of these cheaper sources would reduce attractiveness of relatively expensive renewable sources. Consequently, we would expect the connection to be negative, as shown by Marques et al.
On the other hand, oil-fired power plants tend to produce more expensive electricity, so we expect a positive connection between the share of oil power and RES-E development. The "Golden Age of Gas" (IEA 2011b) is partly driven by the fact that gas plants can serve as a backup source to highly intermittent renewables. Therefore, we also expect a positive link between RES-E development and natural gas share.
Carley (2009) illustrates the importance of controlling for GDP per capita, finding that is has a strong positive impact on RES-E generation. Also following Shrimali and Kniefel (2010) , we expect GDP per capita to support development of RES-E. We assume that wealthier countries will possess to a greater degree the technological expertise, infrastructure, and risk tolerance to invest in more expensive RES-E technologies.
We also expect the total land area of a country to have a positive impact on deployment of RES-E. Larger countries will, on average, contain more suitable land for RES-E installations. Following Marques et al. (2010; , we incorporate this variable into our cross-sectional regressions, though it is dropped from fixed-effects regressions because it is constant over time.
Yin and Powers (2009) point out the importance of energy dependency as a driver of RES-E development. As global reserves of conventional energy sources decline and emerging economies rapidly increase their energy demand, incentivizing RES-E development represents an increasingly common strategy for Western countries to improve their energy independence. Therefore, we expect a positive link between a high share of net imported electricity and RES-E development.
A similar rationale suggests that RES-E capacity will develop more rapidly in countries with high primary energy consumption. Marques (2010; find a significant positive connection between the per capita consumption of energy and the share of renewable energy relative to total energy supply. We include the same variable to verify the connection.
Finally, EU 2001 is a special time binary code differentiating the years before and after the European Commission first ratified a binding RES-E directive. 4 The Directive 2001/EC/77 provides a legally enforceable commitment for the EU member states to implement RES-E support policies. Attempts to comply with the Directive have ranged from strong to negligible, but each member country has passed at least some RES-E legislation as a result. This variable will capture any systematic changes in the responsiveness of RES-E development to drivers before and after the Directive was ratified. Marques et al. (2010; Oil share Natural logarithm of diesel and crude oil to total electricity generation ratio % Eurostat (2011) Marques et al. (2010; Natural gas share Natural logarithm of natural gas to total electricity generation ratio 
The regression model
We assemble historical 1998-2008 panel data on solar PV capacity, onshore wind power capacity, FIT policies, other renewable energy policies, and relevant social and economic variables. We then apply this data within a country-level fixed-effects regression model to assess the effect of FIT policies on wind and PV capacity development. As Shrimali and Kneifel (2011) note, fixed effects control for any country-level characteristics that remain constant over time-including potential for RES-E (e.g. solar insolation and windiness), land area, capacity construction before 1998, and time-invariant environmental preferences. 5 For energy technology i, in country s, in year t, our main regression model is
where Added Capacity ist is the additional RES-E generation capacity installed between years t-1 and t for energy technology i (solar PV or onshore wind); SFIT ist is our technology-specific indicator for FIT strength; INCRQMTSHARE st is the indicator for RPS strength developed in Yin and Powers (2009) ; Z ist is a suite of binary variables that represent other policies designed to encourage RES-E development; W ist is a suite of social and economic variables expected to have an impact on RES-E development; µ s represents country-level fixed effects; and u ist is an error term.
We first run preliminary regressions to establish the baseline relationship between added RES-E capacity and policy variables for both wind and PV. The first is a pooled cross-section regression that does not control for country-level fixed effects and the second is a fixed-effects regression that employs conventional binary policy variables only. We then run a series of regressions using the model given in Equation (1). Results are presented in the following section. Table 5 displays the results of our preliminary pooled cross-section regressions. These regressions reveal a large, positive, and highly significant relationship between FIT policies and RES-E development. This is observed across both technology types and both policy variables (binary and SFIT). As shown in regressions (1) and (3), a country with a FIT in place will install 65.4% more PV capacity or 101% more onshore wind capacity per year than a country with no FIT. As shown in (2) and (4), a 10 percentage point increase in the ROI provided by a FIT policy is associated with an increase in annual capacity added by 10.3% for PV and 4.1% for wind. However, the link between policy and capacity revealed by a pooled cross-section regression cannot be interpreted as causal because omitted variables (such as country characteristics) may bias the coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the natural log of annual RES-E capacity added in MW . * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. Table 6 presents the results from several estimations of our main regression model given in Equation (1). The specifications provided here are identical to those in Table 5 except that we now employ state-level fixed effects to control for unobserved state characteristics that are static over time. Across both technology types and both policy variables, coefficients are universally lower when fixed effects are introduced. Furthermore, the coefficient on binary FIT becomes insignificant for PV and the coefficient on SFIT moves from significance at the 1% level to significance at the 10% level for wind. This implies that there are country-specific characteristics that are correlated with both FIT implementation and RES-E development and therefore introduce positive bias in Table 5 . Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the natural log of annual RES-E capacity added in MW . * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.
Results
However, the fixed-effects regression results indicate that feed-in tariffs have driven solar PV and onshore wind development in Europe since 1998, even when fixed country characteristics are controlled. Specifically, regressions (2) and (4) indicate that for a 10 percentage point increase in the ROI provided by a FIT policy, countries will install 7.4% more PV capacity and 2.6% more onshore wind capacity per year on average. However, both the magnitude and significance of coefficients vary dramatically between regressions (1) and (2) and regressions (3) and (4), implying that policy design features are an important control. In the case of PV, the FIT coefficient is much smaller and insignificant when a simple binary policy variable is used in (1), implying that there is a genuine relationship between policy and development that is masked without taking into account the unique design of each FIT.
Several control variables in the fixed-effects regression are significant determinants of RES-E capacity development as well. For onshore wind, tendering schemes appear to reduce annual capacity installations and per capita GPD appears to increase them. For solar PV, countries that generate a greater portion of total electricity with oil and gas typically install more PV capacity each year, whereas those with higher proportions of coal-fired and nuclear electricity install less. These results are discussed in more detail in the following section.
Discussion
Interpretation of findings
The results of this analysis confirm the general conclusion in the literature that feed-in tariffs have driven RES-E capacity development in Europe. A key question for policymakers is whether FIT policies increase RES-E development beyond the rate at which it would have developed otherwise. In other words, do the policies have a marginal impact on capacity, or do countries incur public expense to subsidize only inframarginal development that would have happened anyway? Our panel-driven fixed-effects approach verifies that FIT policies have contributed some marginal impact by providing a true production incentive, though the results are not sufficient to make claims about the portion of each tariff that provides marginal vs. inframarginal incentive.
Our results also reinforce the importance of incorporating information about unique policy design elements into econometric analysis of RES-E policies. Including a statistical representation of return on investment into our regressions, rather than relying on traditional binary policy variables, produces dramatically different results. In the case of solar PV, the link between FIT policies and RES-E development is insignificant when using a binary indicator and significant at less than 1% when using SFIT. The implication of this result is that specific policy design and market characteristics matter more than the presence of a policy alone in determining RES-E development. In other words, not all feed-in tariffs are created equal: they do not increase solar PV capacity development simply by virtue of being enacted, but it can be shown that the higher true ROI they provide, the more capacity will be installed on average. This insight is informative in a world of political discourse that is often more focused on the morality of a policy type than on the intricacies of its specific design.
Our analysis of FIT policies follows a pattern similar to that of the three groups of RPS literature discussed in Section 2. Like the first group, we see a large, positive, and highly significant link between policy and development when using a pooled cross-section model. However, this effect can be both intuitively assumed and statistically shown to be overstated because it is biased by unobserved country characteristics that influence both policy and development. When we include controls for fixed effects per the second group of studies, this apparent link is dramatically reduced (for wind) or becomes statistically insignificant (for PV). Finally, when we employ a more nuanced indicator that reflects the true incentive provided by a FIT-as Yin and Powers (2009) did for RPS-we reestablish a firm link between policy and development. We hope that these results will motivate careful consideration of controls and policy design in future RES-E policy analysis.
Our estimations do not provide evidence that non-FIT RES-E policies have increased capacity development. In fact, they imply that tendering schemes have decreased it. This may be due to the small size of the "treatment" group of countries that implemented these policies between 1998 and 2008.
Other than GDP per capita, most of our economic control variables were not shown to be significant determinants of RES-E development. GDP per capita has a positive connection to wind capacity development. One explanation may be the typically high capital cost of setting up a wind park. Low-income countries are less likely to be able to supply this capital from the private or public sectors. Yin and Powers (2009) found a significant, positive impact associated with the ratio of net imports of electricity to domestically produced electricity, but we did not confirm this link. Marques et al. (2010) showed in their fixed effects regression that there is a slight underlying influence of per capita energy consumption but our estimates did not reflect this finding. Because our fixed-effects model drops variables that are constant over time, we could not verify the significant, positive effect of land area on RES-E deployment that was demonstrated by the FEVD model in Marques et al. (2010) . However, our pooled cross-section regressions do indicate a strong relationship between land area and RES-E development.
Our estimations reveal several interesting connections between electricity generation fuel mix and solar PV capacity development. While Marques et al. (2010; found negative links for these four fossil source controls, we find positive as well as negative effects. The nuclear share has a negative impact on capacity development. Since nuclear electricity is typically among the most price-competitive technologies, countries with a large share of nuclear electricity production may be more reluctant to replace this zero-emission base-load technology with its expensive renewable counterparts. It is harder to compete against such a low-emission, low-cost technology. The same link holds true for the share of electricity production derived from coal and lignite. These fossil fuels typically account for a large share of base-load generation and are relatively affordable. If a country has large coal reserves, RES-E development becomes less attractive. In contrast, the ratios of gas-fired and oil-fired capacity to total capacity are associated with more RES-E capacity development. Since gas-fired power plants can be brought online and offline more quickly than coal or nuclear plants, they often serve as backup capacity for intermittent electricity sources such as PV and wind, which are subject to day/night cycles and weather. Finally, oil, infrequently used for electricity generation and increasingly scarce in supply, is an expensive fuel source. States that still rely on oil to produce a significant amount of electricity have a strong financial incentive to replace this capacity with RES-E.
A more nuanced SFIT indicator
The SFIT indicator we employed for our empirical investigation is a fine-grained metric to assess the real strength of a FIT. Our regressions show that it reveals a link between FIT policies and RES-E development that would have been masked using a traditional binary policy variable. SFIT does not incorporate all relevant variables that help determine the investment incentive created by a FIT, but it can serve as a stepping-stone to develop a more informative and comprehensive theoretical indicator that incorporates factors we cannot currently measure empirically.
Stimulating investment with FIT policies is a complex matter, and it is important to understand that some additional factors contribute to the uniqueness of each policy and the market it affects. Investment is not done in a social and economic vacuum under perfect market conditions, but in a dynamic environment of uncertainties and bounded rationality of its actors (Simon 1957) . Investment decisions are embedded in a socio-economic reality that is shaped by interactions and dynamics we cannot quantify at this point. What we can do, however, is to further elaborate on our SFIT indicator and use it as a theoretical tool to better understand some of these more amorphous factors.
This expanded indicator, which we will call SFITU because it incorporates elements of uncertainty, may take the following form, for energy technology i, in country s, in year t: 
As discussed in Masini and Menichetti (2010) , there are three sources of ex-ante uncertainty that may influence investment decisions.
The first has to do with technology. Risk concerning the RES-E technology's current efficiency and future cost development will impact the investment choice as well as the timing of investment.
To account for technological uncertainty, we expand SFIT by incorporating the purely theoretical parameter for technological uncertainty. It primarily affects fixed upfront costs faced by RES-E investors. As has been pointed out by Nemet (2007) and others, technologies become more costefficient over time. Since successful innovations have a heavily left-tailed distribution and are hard to predict, investors will experience additional uncertainty in making long-term investments in high-technology products. Therefore, we assume has a positive impact on expected future costs which yields a negative impact on current investment incentive, such that 0. The conservative investor may shift investment to the future if he expects a divergence caused by costs decreasing faster than the tariff digresses (
. If policymakers seem more likely to reduce or eliminate tariffs in the future, investment in the present will look more attractive.
The second involves uncertainty surrounding the market at large. In SFITU, we represent spot market uncertainty with µ. Premium tariffs are paid as a bonus to the spot market price. Therefore, the expected return on investment largely depends on this price. Since fluctuations are inevitable and the general trend of price development is unclear even (or especially) to researchers, investors add another element of uncertainty to their calculus. Since uncertainty decreases attractiveness in the long-run, we assume µ 0 for risk-averse investors. Price uncertainty also decreases SFIT in combination with low contract durations because the capacity will be operating for more of its lifetime without the added benefit of a tariff and will be reliant on market price only for revenue. The years that occur during the capacity's lifetime (LT) but after the contract duration (CT) has ended will add vulnerability of µ for the investor.
The political environment is a third source of uncertainty for the investor. In SFITU, represents the degree of political uncertainty surrounding the FIT policy. We expect 0, which means that an increase in political instability or a loss of political reliability adds doubt to the expected return on investment of RES-E capacity. If a FIT can be repealed or revised, investors are more reluctant to direct capital into projects that rely on the FIT for good returns. In most cases, the contractor is legally entitled to receive a fixed tariff. However, the example of Spain shows that legislators may violate this long-term commitment in times of short-term economic turmoil, thus putting the expected return on investment at risk.
Finally, the term Δ represents the portion of the electricity price which is added because the FIT redistributes money between end-users in order to finance the FIT. In some cases, the price of the tariff is allocated to end-users by increasing the price of electricity generated from conventional sources. The more heavily RES-E is subsidized by a FIT, the more money is added to the pre-FIT market price, which in turn leads to an increase in SFITU, such that Δ 0. In other words, the FIT can be a self-reinforcing mechanism to promote RES-E while the end-users or the state budget bear the cost.
The elements of uncertainty included in SFITU are difficult to represent empirically. However, there may be opportunities to use proxy data, survey results, or other strategies to characterize them in future studies. In the mean time, SFITU serves as a useful theoretical tool for thinking about how future uncertainty and risk affect RES-E investment decisions today.
Conclusion
This paper provides the first rigorous econometric analysis of feed-in tariff policy effectiveness in Europe. Previous analyses of RES-E policies in general have often taken a blunt approach, using cross-sectional models or ignoring differences in policy design.
In this paper, we employ a fixed-effects regression model to control for country-level characteristics. We also introduce a new measure of policy strength that represents the return on investment provided by feed-in tariffs. We find that FIT policies have driven solar photovoltaic and onshore wind power capacity development in Europe since 1998. We verify that fixed country-level characteristics will bias the results if not controlled, and we show that accounting for the unique design of each FIT often reveals a link between policy and RES-E development that is otherwise obscured.
These results imply that the design of each policy and the market it affects are more important determinants of RES-E development than the enactment of a policy alone. This should prove informative to both researchers and policymakers. In future analyses, we hope to (1) more rigorously characterize the uncertainty surrounding policy and market conditions and (2) analyze the relative impact of each policy design element on RES-E development. This may provide insight into strategies for optimizing FIT performance. 
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